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Abstract
This article presents a critique of the Copenhagen Consensus Center's(CCC) exhaustive study on
transnational terrorism, published in 2008.The implications of this study are controversial, yet highly
relevant in today's economic environment. The Obama administration must come toterms with fiscal
realities that will challenge budget priorities and invigorate what will undoubtedly prove to be tough
negotiations on Capitol Hill for homeland security dollars. It is proposed here that standard economic
tools such as benefit cost analysis, cost effectiveness criteria, and simulation models can help identify
areas where security can be either extended or improved using fewer resources. Greater movement
towards competitive procurement practices will also result in lower costs and higher returns on
security investments.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss3/433
What Price Security?
By Donald C. Masters, Ph.D.
Introduction
This article presents a critique of the Copenhagen Consensus Center's 
(CCC) exhaustive study on transnational terrorism, published in 2008. 
The implications of this study are controversial, yet highly relevant in 
today's economic environment. The Obama administration must come to 
terms with fiscal realities that will challenge budget priorities and invigo-
rate what will undoubtedly prove to be tough negotiations on Capitol Hill 
for homeland security dollars. It is proposed here that standard economic 
tools such as benefit cost analysis, cost effectiveness criteria, and simula-
tion models can help identify areas where security can be either extended 
or improved using fewer resources. Greater movement towards competi-
tive procurement practices will also result in lower costs and higher 
returns on security investments.
The Copenhagen Study
For this study, the Copenhagen Center commissioned two academic econ-
omists, Todd Sandler and Walter Enders of the Universities of Texas and 
Alabama respectively, to evaluate the human costs and economic conse-
quences of terrorism in conjunction with government expenditures on 
anti-terrorism efforts.1 The study's objective was to quantify the benefits 
of (a) lives saved and injuries avoided and (b) economic losses averted 
compared to the budgetary costs associated with homeland security. Their 
research uses standard benefit-cost methodology to calculate the esti-
mated return on investment compared to alternative "solutions."
The study deals only with "transnational" terrorism, defined as terrorist 
activity that crosses international borders as opposed to domestic insur-
gencies or resistance to foreign occupation. They observe that "terrorism 
is a tactic of asymmetric conflict, deployed by the weak for strategic 
advantage against a strong opponent." In their view, there is no perma-
nent solution to transnational terrorism because it is a cost effective tac-
tic. Their analysis of international trends related to terrorist incidents 
found that on average 420 people are killed and 1,249 are injured annu-
ally.2 Yet, guarding against terrorism can consume resources at an alarm-
ing rate without a permanent reduction in terrorist activity.
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Obviously, an international study of this complexity requires some heroic 
assumptions regarding the relative magnitudes of benefits and costs. By 
and large, the authors are explicit in stating their underlying assumptions 
and conducted extensive sensitivity analysis to determine the reasonable-
ness of their estimates. Where reasonable doubt exists they took the opti-
mistic scenario favoring higher benefits or lower costs. The data for the 
main variables driving benefits and costs were estimated from a number 
of studies or drawn from official budgets and national income accounts.
Benefit Cost Ratios
Benefit cost ratios (BCR) are one method for calculating the net dis-
counted return on investment. The BCR is a discounted ratio of benefits 
to costs. It is similar to the more familiar present value approach, which 
subtracts discounted costs from benefits to show net return. Accordingly, 
the present value method provides an absolute dollar value while BCR is a 
ratio expressed in decimal form. The investment rule (for both) is to make 
the investment if either is greater than one, assuming full access to capital 
resources. If resources are constrained (the normal situation) then either 
method can be used to rank order alternative investments from highest 
ranked investment down to the investment that exhausts available capital 
resources. When there is lack of certainty regarding the benefits and costs 
over time, then the BCR method takes on characteristics similar to a prob-
abilistic decision model. In other words, the BCR approach estimates an 
order of magnitude based on a range of values for key variables driving 
the analysis.
In the Copenhagen study, three key variables are identified as determin-
ing benefits and costs. They are: (1) fatalities and injuries sustained in ter-
rorist attacks, (2) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) losses associated with 
destruction or disruption of economic activity, and (3) security costs to 
governments in countering terrorist threats. Although all three are calcu-
lated as "costs" either to terrorism victims or their governments, the first 
two are treated as benefits that would accrue if government anti-terrorist 
programs cause these losses to be averted. Alternatively stated, the bene-
fit cost approach compares terrorism losses to society that would have 
occurred if governments did not undertake security measures to protect 
their citizens. In the arcane language of the economist, the benefit cost 
approach estimates a counterfactual of what would have occurred in the 
absence of investments in security measures. In this manner, net benefits 
and costs can be compared when appropriately discounted over a period 
of time. In this study, five-year capitalized values were used for both ben-
efits and costs. Briefly, the key variables are as follows:
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Benefits
Available data were assembled to show average annual casualties in terms 
of deaths and injuries due to terrorist acts. The fatalities were valued in 
terms of life expectancies at the time of death and compensation paid to 
families. The injuries were categorized by type and severity in order to 
estimate their weighted distribution and corresponding disability costs. 
This weighted cost formula was derived from a French study that used 
time series data for fatalities and injuries associated with a typical terror-
ist incident. Thus, the number of fatalities along with the associated 
(weighted distribution) injuries could be "priced" to show the dollar value 
of benefit of an averted terrorist attack attributable to enhanced home-
land security. The variable estimated could then be adjusted to reflect 
higher or lower death compensation and disability values by region and 
average per capita income.
Since terrorism destroys property and/or disrupts economic activity, an 
estimate of economic costs was also calculated. The authors used esti-
mates provided in a 2004 study that calculated the economic losses in 
terms of forgone economic growth on a per capita basis. The estimates 
were then applied to countries that experienced transnational terrorism 
over the period 2001–2005. The data sources for this calculation came 
from country national income accounts. For example, the GDP loss due to 
foregone growth over a five-year period, for some seventy countries, 
amounted to $83 billion. Of this amount, the United States had the high-
est GDP loss calculation at an estimated $37 billion.3
Costs
The authors relied heavily on public expenditure data from the United 
States and Britain since they (1) represented the main country targets of 
transnational terrorism and (2) their budget data were the most explicit 
regarding security costs since 9/11. There was a high cost estimate for 
"proactive" anti-terrorism efforts, which included both domestic and 
overseas costs associated with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
These costs were converted into a percent of GDP for the base year 2005. 
The lower cost estimate for purely "defensive" homeland security efforts 
was similarly calculated. In the end, the authors used the lower "defen-
sive" cost estimates combined with a lower proxy estimate for the 66 
countries that experienced terrorist acts but were not considered main 
target countries.4
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Analysis Results
The calculated benefit cost ratios (BCRs) ranged from a low of 0.039 to a 
high of 0.095 depending on alternative assumptions. This range is sur-
prisingly low, showing a return on security investments of less than ten 
cents on the dollar. Nevertheless, the calculations are viewed as "robust" 
in light of the data sources and methodologies used.
Alternative "Solutions"
Some of the solutions showing less adverse BCRs are briefly outlined 
below:
•   Greater International Cooperation–Freezing terrorists' financial assets 
would reduce funding available to launch attacks, while greater extradi-
tion of suspected terrorists for prosecution might also reduce their 
organizational capacity. Both would require greater international coop-
eration which, if achieved, would be a low cost option. The stepped up 
monitoring of financial transfers and remittances could be imple-
mented by the International Monetary Fund, working in tandem with 
member country central banks and regulators. The proposed doubling 
of the Interpol budget from $58 million to $116 million would help 
improve international police coordination in apprehending and extra-
diting suspected terrorists. It was noted that this solution would not 
impact on small "routine" attacks but would make larger scale "spectac-
ular" attacks less likely; thereby saving a considerable number of lives 
and property. The BCR ranged from 5.348 to 15.504, giving this 
approach the highest return on investment.
•   Augmented Defensive Measures–Better border security and hardening 
of critical infrastructure as well as public safety measures raise costs 
but might result in 25% fewer successful attacks. However, it was noted 
that there would likely be some transference to softer targets. Coun-
tries taking this approach might well assign a higher compensation 
value thereby raising calculated benefits. Accordingly, the estimated 
BCRs range from 0.281 to 0.304 which are still adverse and (in the 
opinion of the authors) not likely to change significantly with addi-
tional resources dedicated to defensive measures.
General Observations
Clearly the study represents an ambitious effort. While it is possible to 
question some of the techniques used to derive the cost estimates, it is 
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evident that costs tend to overwhelm benefits. This causes the BCRs to fall 
short of the investment breakeven point. At the margin, governments can 
and should seek lower-cost countermeasures while anticipating more 
lethal threats in the future. Although there was some discussion of chemi-
cal, biological, and radiological/nuclear (CBRN) weapons eventually find-
ing their way into terrorist hands, there was no attempt to model this 
eventuality into their benefit cost framework. Rather they suggest that 
there are "inhibitors" that make it unlikely that terrorists will increase 
their lethal capabilities in the foreseeable future.5 This may be an unreal-
istic assumption. A "rogue" state possessing CBRN weapons might col-
lude with terrorists, providing them with the means of inflicting far 
greater casualties and economic loss. Even in the absence of such collu-
sion between a "state actor" and a "non-state actor," a biological weapon 
could be developed by terrorists in the near future.6 Such a scenario 
would shift the benefit stream considerably upwards, yielding a signifi-
cantly higher BCR. This would certainly be a "game changer" and well 
worth considering in greater detail.
Benefit cost analysis is most usefully applied within the same organiza-
tional unit responsible for budget planning and program design. The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would be, in this context, the 
relevant entity with independent oversight provided by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). For public goods, such as security, it is often 
more difficult to value benefits than measure financial costs. For this rea-
son, it is sometimes helpful to develop measurable indicators that corre-
late closely with intended benefits. This requires metrics that 
meaningfully represent improved security, such that cost effectiveness 
becomes the operational measure of efficiency. For example, a security 
program might call for the protection of critical infrastructure with secu-
rity measures designed to "harden" a facility from a possible terrorist 
threat. The task can be defined as selecting security systems that are most 
cost effective in reducing the probability of a successful attack. If a secu-
rity output can be measurably defined, then we are simply looking for the 
least expensive combination of systems, i.e. equipment and personnel 
(inputs) to attain a given level of security (output).
Port security would be an example. The security threat involves the smug-
gling of illicit or dangerous materials in intermodal shipping containers. 
The primary threat would be a bomb of some kind in which the port itself 
or some inland destination may be the intended target. The security mis-
sion is to maintain normal port operations while identifying (and dispos-
ing of, if necessary) containers that pose a serious threat. The 
procurement and deployment task is to do this at least cost.
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Layered Security Systems: Redundant Costs?
The concept of layered security is to create a dense protective shield that 
reduces the risk of a successful terrorist attack. The layered security 
approach is often applied to critical infrastructure. However, without an 
overall measure of facility protection, security "layers" and their associ-
ated costs may be unnecessarily added over time.
Conditional probability theory lends some support to this approach, but 
only if certain conditions are met. To illustrate, assume there are three 
security systems that use older technology that is only 50% effective in 
preventing an attack. In this example, each system probability (p) is set 
equal to 0.50 yielding an effectiveness rate similar to the random flipping 
of a coin. However, when all three systems are used in concert the result-
ing vulnerability declines markedly, as shown below:
(0.50) x (0.50) x (0.50) = 0.125
This yields a 1:8 probability of a successful attack on the facility. This 
probabilistic measure of vulnerability could be further reduced if (a) addi-
tional layers and corresponding probabilities were added and/or (b) bet-
ter security technologies with higher probabilities of prevention were 
substituted for older systems. Importantly, this approach assumes that 
each component system is independent or operates autonomously, such 
that defeating one system does not affect the others. The other condition 
is that none of the systems can be circumvented by the attacker. (Some 
well-known examples of circumvention include the Trojan Horse and, in 
modern times, the Maginot Line).
Taking this illustration further in the context of port security, assume we 
have three systems (Advanced Spectroscopic Portals–ASP, Automated 
Targeting System–ATS, and Hazmat) which together provide detection 
capability against an explosive device, either conventional or radiological/
nuclear. The ASP system relies on different technologies jointly deployed 
amounting to a two-tier scanning process.7 This newer technology costs 
more than five times as much as existing technology. A cost benefit analy-
sis of the two types of scanning equipment was performed but the results 
were inconclusive at the time.8
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this example, assume that an optimal 
technical ratio or deployment configuration has been established, such 
that the operation of the primary scanning system, which is a polyvinyl 
toluene (PVT)-based gamma-ray scintillation detector, is fully coordi-
nated with the more expensive ASP secondary scanners. The result is a 
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combined effectiveness probability of, say, 90%. Similarly, we assign dif-
fering successful attack probabilities for each of the three systems, shown 
below. The first involves analysis of electronic manifests (ATS) and the 
assignment of container risk scores; second, a two-tier scanning system 
(ASP) and, third, a countermeasure procedure to deal with "positive" 
detections (Hazmat). Hence, the port security "architecture" could be 
summarized as follows where the numbers in parentheses represent prob-
abilities of successful detection for each system:
ATS (0.80) x ASP (0.10) x Hazmat (0.25) = 0.020 probability of success
The conditional probability (P) derived from this simple equation sug-
gests that an attack would have only a 1:50 or 2% chance of success. This 
implies that the port is now 98% secured from bomb threats. At this level 
of security, additional "layers" may not be warranted given their associ-
ated costs. However, if a rare (P = 0.020) but potentially high conse-
quence event occurs, then mitigation strategies may be more cost 
effective. To determine this in economic terms, we draw on insurance the-
ory and the concept of expected value of an outcome. This is calculated as 
the product of the probability and the value-at-risk of the asset. This dol-
lar amount determines the risk premium to be paid. If the port facility 
suffered a billion dollar loss then the annual premium would be $20 mil-
lion. Given that more than 10 million containers arrive at U.S. ports every 
year, a fee of $2 per container would cover this premium. Thus, an opti-
mal port strategy might use protective and mitigation strategies 
together, if this translates into greater cost efficiency.
Systems Analysis and Cost Minimization
Models can simulate system operations to help identify and estimate 
security compliance costs borne by the private sector. Several years ago, 
Sandia National Laboratories, drawing on Seattle-Tacoma port data, 
designed a simulation model to evaluate the impact of port security initia-
tives on container operations.9 A team representing experts and stake-
holders pooled information to systematically estimate short- and 
long-term impacts. The resulting port "system dynamics" model esti-
mated short-term effects of increased security on (a) shipping cost and (b) 
delivery time. In addition, the model estimated the port's longer term 
competitive prospects related to increased costs of security measures. 
They concluded that the implementation of security measures in a piece-
meal fashion had competitive disadvantages for "early adopter" ports. The 
simulation took into account the high fixed costs of port operations and 
the limited cost recovery attainable by raising port charges. In a competi-
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tive market, individual ports cannot easily pass on security costs to carri-
ers since this could divert shipping traffic. The related loss in container 
volumes creates a dynamic leading to a downward "revenue" spiral that 
could ultimately threaten port commercial viability.
Sandia's simulation exercise suggests that security enhancements should 
take into account their effects on commercial operations. Even though 
equipment costs may be borne by the government, at least initially the 
localized impact on port operations may generate significant private 
costs. One approach for planned rollouts of new security measures would 
be the development of a "generic" port model. This could identify the 
main parameters that influence trade flows and operational costs, which 
could then be built-out or "customized" for specific port conditions. This 
might include the number of loading and stacking cranes available; con-
tainer ship berths and schedules; and container storage areas linked to 
onward transportation facilities. The flow of containers per unit of time 
(or "throughput") could be estimated given infrastructure constraints and 
security requirements. The constrained optimization problem would be 
to minimize time delays and associated costs while achieving a predeter-
mined level of port security.
Procurement Reform
The search for "economies" with respect to homeland security will inevi-
tably turn to procurement. The ability of DHS to secure favorable prices 
from suppliers and contractors is critical given the magnitudes involved. 
The value of contracts awarded by the DHS claimed one-third of budget 
resources in fiscal years 2006–2008. This amounted to approximately 
$40 billion over a three-year period. Moreover, DHS grants to state and 
local institutions create cascading procurements that have substantial 
resource allocation implications. The Federal Acquisition Act, as 
amended, formally enshrines "competition" as the guiding principle for 
all government procurements. Following 9/11, Congress gave DHS exten-
sive procurement authorities as well as multi-year program funding. This 
included "other" procurement methods (non-competitive) to expedite the 
nation's defenses to counter expected terrorist attacks. As a consequence, 
large multi-year contracts were awarded on a non-competitive basis, usu-
ally justified by the determination that only one firm had "predominant 
capability" in a certain technical area.
As late as fiscal year 2006, roughly 39% of all federal contracts fell into 
the category "not competed for an allowable reason."10 In more recent 
years, there has been movement towards less prescribed contracting prac-
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tices. Nevertheless, the category "competed but only one bid was 
received," suggests a lack of effective competition. Combining these two 
categories gives a ratio of non-competitive to competitive awards of 
roughly two to one. Overall, 50% of all DHS procurements between fiscal 
years 2006–2008 were less than fully competitive. Economists generally 
agree that competition provides the lowest prices, thereby mobilizing the 
most resources from a given budget. Thus, an indicator of procurement 
reform would be contract awards gradually becoming more competitive.
The deployment of new advanced technologies poses the most difficulty to 
procurement reforms since (by definition) they do not have exact bid 
specifications or "off the shelf" equivalents. For this reason, grant funding 
is often used for applied research and development of prototypes. How-
ever, technologically sophisticated contracts have been awarded for 
large-scale projects. Various GAO reports suggest that the procurement 
methods, including contract management at the implementation stage, 
have proved problematic in certain cases. Well known indicators include 
significant project delays and related cost overruns. These projects are 
technology intensive and often complex, requiring exceptional manage-
ment oversight. The latter cannot easily be "contracted out" as this some-
times poses conflicts of interest. On balance, DHS may have to consider a 
number of options that will increase internal administrative costs. One 
would be the development of a technical cadre to serve as program man-
agers. Another option would be to hire and train additional procurement 
officers to handle the increased workload related to smaller "bite size" 
contracts. These would be more labor-intensive to compete but would 
encourage greater medium-size firm participation. Firms in this size cate-
gory may prove more adept at designing and implementing less costly 
security systems.
Conclusion
Projected U.S. Government deficits will likely create a constrained fiscal 
environment in the years ahead. Barring another high profile terrorist 
attack on American soil, homeland security may become less of a budget 
priority. Coming to terms with the new fiscal realities will be a major chal-
lenge for senior management. We have suggested here that standard eco-
nomic tools such as benefit cost analysis, cost effectiveness criteria, and 
simulation models can help identify areas where security can be either 
extended or improved using fewer resources. Greater movement towards 
competitive procurement practices will also result in lower costs and 
higher returns on security investments.
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